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T         
he Federal Reserve aggressively eased monetary policy during 
the 2008-09 global financial crisis. The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) cut the federal funds rate target to near 
zero, and the Board of Governors introduced a number of novel liquid-
ity facilities. In addition, the FOMC purchased long-term Treasuries 
and agency mortgage-backed securities on a large scale. These actions 
caused the Fed’s balance sheet to balloon. 
As the balance sheet grew to unprecedented size, the Open Market 
Desk at the New York Fed found it increasingly difficult to achieve the 
FOMC’s target funds rate. In response, in October 2008, as authorized 
under the Financial Services Regulatory Act of 2006 and the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Federal Reserve began 
paying interest on excess reserves. This interest rate was expected to 
establish a floor under the federal funds rate. The discount rate—which 
since January 2003 has been set as a penalty rate above the funds rate 
target—was expected to limit upward pressure on the funds rate. 
With these moves, the Federal Reserve’s operating framework now 
incorporates the essential elements of a “channel” or “corridor” system. 
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In such a system, the target for the federal funds rate would typically 
be set within the corridor established by the discount rate at the ceiling 
and the interest rate on excess reserves at the floor. Although the Federal 
Reserve has not formally adopted a channel system, establishing a floor 
under the federal funds rate target will be especially important as the 
Federal Reserve begins to exit its highly accommodative policy stance. 
While a corridor framework may offer a number of advantages as 
an operating system, it may also create new challenges. The key advan-
tages are that it could help the Federal Reserve achieve its target for the 
federal funds rate while allowing the balance sheet to act as an indepen-
dent tool of policy. A key question is whether the discount rate will be 
an effective ceiling and the interest rate on excess reserves an effective 
floor. In addition, how changes in the funds rate target, the discount 
rate, and the rate on excess reserves will be sequenced is unclear. In par-
ticular, the roles of the FOMC, Board of Governors, and Reserve Bank 
Boards of Directors in such a system may need to be clarified. 
This article examines how a corridor system works in theory and 
practice. The first section of the article explores how the Federal Re-
serve has traditionally sought to achieve its target for the federal funds 
rate and why that no longer works. The second section describes the 
advantages of a corridor operating system, shows how other central 
banks have operated such a system, and discusses potential problems in 
implementing the corridor system in the United States.
I.  HOW HAS THE FEDERAL RESERVE TRADITIONALLY 
OPERATED?
Understanding the merits and potential pitfalls of a corridor oper-
ating system first requires understanding the operating procedure tra-
ditionally used by the Federal Reserve to achieve the FOMC’s target 
federal funds rate. Potential operational problems and actual policy 
concerns with this traditional operating framework have prompted 
policymakers and economists to consider alternatives. 
The traditional framework
The FOMC sets a target for the federal funds rate consistent with 
its objectives of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
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achieving the target federal funds rate differs from the approach re-
quired under a corridor system. Traditionally, the FOMC has instruct-
ed the Open Market Trading Desk at the New York Federal Reserve 
to conduct open market operations to achieve the Committee’s target 
funds rate. The Desk carries out its role by estimating the quantity of 
reserves that will be demanded given the FOMC’s target federal funds 
rate and supplying the reserves required to meet that demand at the 
target federal funds rate.2 
The demand for reserves comes in part from reserve requirements 
set by the Board of Governors under limits set by Congress. This 
demand depends on the amount of transactions deposits the public 
chooses to hold at depository institutions. In addition, financial institu-
tions typically hold some reserves in excess of requirements as a precau-
tion against reserve account deficiencies, and they maintain settlement 
balances at the Fed to clear and settle transactions with each other and 
with the government.
The demand for reserve and settlement balances at the Fed is in-
versely related to the federal funds rate—the rate banks charge each 
other for overnight loans of reserves. This inverse relationship stems 
from two effects. First, higher interest rates cause the public to reduce 
their holdings of transactions deposits that are subject to reserve re-
quirements and increase holdings of higher yielding non-transactions 
accounts that are not subject to reserve requirements. Second, higher 
interest rates cause financial institutions to limit their holdings of excess 
reserves and settlement balances. Before 2008, such balances generally 
paid no interest. As a result, the opportunity cost of holding these bal-
ances rose with increases in the federal funds rate, causing financial 
institutions to economize on their holdings.
While depository institutions determine the demand for reserves, 
the Federal Reserve has significant influence over the supply of reserves. 
In particular, the supply depends on the size of the Federal Reserve’s 
portfolio of securities and repurchase agreements, the amount of loans 
made to depository institutions through the discount window, and on a 
number of autonomous factors outside the Federal Reserve’s day-to-day 
control. Autonomous factors include changes in the public’s demand 
for currency and the Treasury’s balance at the Federal Reserve. 8  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The Federal Reserve can change the supply of reserves through open 
market purchases or sales of securities, or through repurchase agree-
ments (RPs) and reverse RPs. For example, to increase the supply of 
reserves, the Federal Reserve can purchase Treasury securities from the 
public, crediting the reserve account of the seller’s bank.
To achieve the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate, the Open 
Market Desk estimates the demand for reserves and, through open mar-
ket operations, supplies the quantity of reserves necessary to equate sup-
ply and demand at the target funds rate. The Federal Reserve can lower 
the federal funds rate by increasing the supply of reserves or raise the 
funds rate by reducing the supply. Given the autonomous factors affect-
ing supply that are outside the Fed’s direct control and volatility in the 
demand for reserves, the funds rate may deviate from target on a daily 
basis. Volatility is limited, however, by the availability of the discount 
window to supply reserves when, despite the actions of the Desk, the 
federal funds rate rises above the target rate.  
Why the traditional framework no longer works
The traditional framework’s ability to achieve the target federal funds 
rate without excessive interest rate volatility began to be questioned in 
the 1990s when required reserves appeared to be on the decline. More 
recently, the traditional framework has been undermined by the explo-
sion in reserves caused by the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
A scarcity of reserves. The traditional framework for achieving the 
target federal funds rate began to be reconsidered in the mid-1990s as 
the Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements and commercial banks 
found innovative ways to reduce their demand for required reserves. 
The Federal Reserve cut reserve requirements to reduce the implicit 
“tax” depository institutions paid on those reserves. With no interest 
paid on reserves before 2008, the tax imposed by reserve requirements 
essentially equaled the interest reserves could have earned had they been 
invested in interest-bearing assets. Reserve requirements, therefore, cre-
ated a financial market distortion that put depository institutions at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to other financial institutions. To 
limit this distortion, the Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements 
twice in the 1990s—eliminating the 3 percent requirement on non-ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  9
transactions accounts in December 1990 and cutting the requirement 
on transactions accounts from 12 percent to 10 percent in April 1992. 
Other central banks also lowered reserve requirements, with some elim-
inating them altogether. 
At the same time, depository institutions sought ways to reduce their 
need to hold non-interest bearing reserves through various financial in-
novations. For example, in the United States, depository institutions cre-
ated new types of accounts—such as certificates of deposit, Eurodollar 
borrowing, repurchase agreements, and sweep accounts—with features 
similar to deposit accounts but not subject to reserve requirements.3 
Together, the effect of lower reserve requirements and financial in-
novation reduced required reserve balances. Chart 1 shows the down-
ward trend in required reserves that occurred as a result of these de-
velopments from the early 1990s to 2000. From 2000 to 2006, these 
effects were mitigated by a low interest rate environment that reduced 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Nevertheless, until the finan-
cial crisis of 2008-09, the level of reserves remained well below its peak 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The reduction in required reserves beginning in the early 1990s 
caused concern that the Federal Reserve could lose control over the 
federal funds rate target. In particular, if reserve requirements fell below 
the level depository institutions maintained in clearing and settlement 
balances at the Federal Reserve, the funds rate would no longer depend 
on the demand for reserves. Rather, the funds rate would depend on 
the demand for, and supply of, settlement balances. The demand for 
these balances would in turn depend on payments flows and institu-
tional features of the payments system, such as penalties imposed by 
the central bank on settlement balance overdrafts. If the demand for 
settlement balances were more volatile and difficult to predict than the 
traditional demand for reserve balances, the central bank could find 
it hard to determine the open market operations necessary to hit the 
funds rate target. As a result, the funds rate could become more volatile 
and difficult to control.4      
An abundance of reserves. More recently, the traditional framework 
has been complicated, not by a decline in reserve balances, but by a 
huge run-up in excess reserves. Beginning in 2008, the Federal Reserve 
greatly expanded its balance sheet in response to the global financial 10  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
crisis (Chart 2). At first, the expansion occurred through the provision 
of liquidity to key credit markets and lending to financial institutions. 
Later, the Federal Reserve began a large-scale asset purchase program 
under which it bought $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties and $300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities. These purchas-
es were financed through the creation of bank reserves well in excess of 
reserve requirements, swelling the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet from 
roughly $800 billion in 2007 to $2.3 trillion at the end of 2009.5 The 
purpose of the program was to provide support for mortgage lending, 
improve conditions in private credit markets, and ultimately help re-
duce long-term interest rates. Lower rates, in turn, were expected to 
stimulate economic activity. 
As the supply of reserves increased dramatically, the federal funds 
rate came under considerable downward pressure. Although the FOMC 
lowered its target for the federal funds rate to 1 percent at the end of 
October 2008 and to a range of 0 to ¼ percent in December 2008, the 
ample supply of excess reserves kept the funds rate trading persistently 
below its target (Chart 3). In essence, the Federal Reserve’s Open Mar-
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manded at the target federal funds rate. As a result, the effective federal 
funds rate fell below the target rate.
Beginning in October 2008, the Federal Reserve began paying in-
terest on reserves as authorized under the Financial Services Regulatory 
Act of 2006 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
In addition to essentially eliminating the opportunity cost of holding 
required reserves and promoting efficiency in the banking sector, the 
purpose was to help establish a lower bound on the federal funds rate. 
Such a lower bound would in turn “permit the Federal Reserve to ex-
pand its balance sheet as necessary to provide the liquidity necessary 
to support financial stability while implementing the monetary policy 
that is appropriate in light of the System’s macroeconomic objectives 
of maximum employment and price stability” (FOMC Press Release, 
October 6, 2008). 
Initially, the interest rate paid on required reserve balances was the 
targeted federal funds rate less ten basis points, and the rate paid on 
excess balances was the targeted federal funds rate less 75 basis points.6  
Over the next couple of months, however, as it became apparent that 
these rates on reserve balances were not sufficient to establish a floor 
under the target funds rate, the FOMC gradually narrowed the dif-
ference between the target funds rate and the rate paid on reserves. By 
mid-December 2008, when the FOMC lowered the funds rate target to 
a range of 0 to 25 basis points, the Board of Governors set the interest 
rate on both required and excess reserves at 25 basis points. Since that 
time, the funds rate has traded within its target range but still persis-
tently below the interest rate on excess and required reserves.
II.  WHAT IS A CORRIDOR FRAMEWORK?
A corridor operating framework can, in theory, help a central bank 
achieve a target policy rate in an environment in which reserve require-
ments are not binding—due either to low or nonexistent reserve re-
quirements or the use of the central bank’s balance sheet as a policy 
instrument independent of the policy interest rate. In practice, the cor-
ridor system has effectively stabilized the policy rate near its target in 
a number of countries. In the United States, however, the potential 
effectiveness of the corridor system is yet to be established since it has 
not been fully implemented. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  13
Theory
In theory, a corridor system could limit volatility in the policy rate 
and isolate interest rate policy from the size of the balance sheet.7 In 
a corridor system, as in the traditional framework, the central bank 
chooses a target for the overnight policy rate consistent with its goals 
for inflation and economic growth. And, as in the traditional frame-
work, the central bank supplies a certain level of reserves to the banking 
system, which it can influence through open market operations.8 In 
addition, the central bank establishes a lending facility similar to the 
Fed’s discount window, but through which it stands ready to supply 
whatever amount of overnight balances are demanded at a fixed inter-
est rate.9 The interest rate is set above the target policy rate to impose 
a penalty on depository institutions that borrow from the central bank 
rather than in the interbank market. 
The final element of a corridor system is the floor established under 
the overnight rate. This floor can be thought of in two different ways. 
First, it could be viewed as a standing facility in which depository insti-
tutions can deposit their excess reserves overnight at a fixed interest rate. 
Analogous to the discount rate, the deposit rate would be set below the 
target policy rate to provide an incentive for the depository institution 
to invest surplus funds in the overnight interbank market instead of at 
the central bank. Equivalently, the floor could be viewed in the more 
traditional sense as the interest rate paid on reserves, which also is typi-
cally set below the target interest rate. 
With a ceiling and floor established, a corridor is defined that limits 
fluctuations in the overnight policy rate.10 When depository institu-
tions are short on required reserve balances, they would have no reason 
to pay a rate higher than the discount rate to borrow funds overnight. 
And, when holding excess balances, they would have no reason to ac-
cept a rate lower than the deposit rate (or rate on excess reserves) offered 
by the central bank. Moreover, at rates between the ceiling and the 
floor, depository institutions with a shortage of funds have an incentive 
to borrow from institutions that have excess funds, establishing an ac-
tive private market for overnight liquidity. As a result, regardless of the 
supply of reserves, the central bank can tightly control the interest rate 
on overnight funds.       14  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Figure 1 illustrates how the system works. The overnight interest 
rate, i, is on the vertical axis, and the quantity of reserves, R, is on the 
horizontal axis. The demand schedule for reserve balances, D, is per-
fectly elastic (horizontal) at the discount rate, id, because no depository 
institution would be willing to borrow funds in the interbank market at 
a higher rate than the central bank is charging. The demand schedule is 
also perfectly elastic at the interest rate on excess reserves, ir, because no 
institution would be willing to loan overnight funds in the interbank 
market at a lower rate than the central bank is offering to pay. 
Between the discount rate and the rate on excess reserves, the de-
mand schedule is downward sloping. In this area, depository institu-
tions balance the potential costs of falling short of their reserve or settle-
ment requirements—and therefore having to borrow on the interbank 
market—against the cost of having excess reserves. As the rate on over-
night funds falls, the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves as a 
precaution against a shortfall of reserves falls. As a result, the demand 
schedule is downward sloping. 
The supply of reserves is traced out by the schedule labeled S. The 
vertical segment of the supply curve, located at R *, is determined by the 
central bank and influenced by open market operations. Open market 
purchases increase reserves and shift the vertical segment to the right. 
Open market sales have the opposite effect, shifting the vertical seg-
ment to the left. The position of the horizontal segment to the left of 
R * is determined by the deposit rate or rate on excess reserves. This rate 
puts a floor under the overnight rate regardless of how low the demand 
for central bank balances may fall. 
The position of the horizontal segment to the right of R * is deter-
mined by the discount rate, i d. As the demand for central bank balances 
increases, the resulting increase in the interbank rate is limited by the 
rate the central bank charges at it lending facility. Once this rate is hit, 
all additional demand for reserves is met through central bank lending. 
This occurs because no depository institution would be willing to pay a 
higher rate than what the central bank was charging.
The equilibrium overnight rate is determined by the intersection of 
the supply and demand schedules. As shown in Figure 1, that intersec-
tion occurs at interest rate i * and reserve balances R *. Regardless of how 
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the overnight rate will be limited to a range from ir to id. Fluctuations 
in the overnight rate can be further limited by open market operations 
that move the supply of reserves to offset anticipated shifts in the de-
mand for central bank balances. In this way, fairly tight control can be 
maintained over the target rate. 
When reserves are sufficiently plentiful that the supply curve inter-
sects the demand curve in its horizontal region at the interest rate on 
reserves, the policy rate falls to the floor of the corridor. Conducting 
monetary policy in this region of the demand curve is a variant of the 
corridor system referred to as a floor operating system. In a floor sys-
tem, the interest rate on reserves becomes the target rate for monetary 
policy. Such a system has the advantage of allowing the central bank to 
change its target policy rate without necessarily changing the supply of 
reserves as in the traditional operating framework (Keister, Martin, and 
McAndrews; Goodfriend). 
As shown in Figure 2, in a corridor system, the central bank can 
change the target policy rate by simply announcing a change in floor 
and ceiling of the corridor. For example, to raise the target policy rate, 
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reserve requirements where depository institutions’ demand for reserves 
stemmed only from their demand for settlement balances. Flexibility 
could also be important during a financial crisis, where the central bank 
needed to greatly increase the liquidity in the banking system.   
The corridor system also allows the central bank to change the sup-
ply of reserves while maintaining control over the policy rate. When 
the central bank increases the supply of reserves, the supply schedule 
shifts to the right, as illustrated in Figure 3 by the shift from S1 to S2. In 
the traditional framework (not shown in the figure), such an increase 
in reserves would cause the policy rate to decline along a continuously 
downward-sloping demand curve. As the supply was steadily increased, 
the policy rate would eventually fall to the zero lower bound. In the 
corridor system, however, the decline in the policy rate is limited by 
floor of the corridor—the interest rate on excess reserves. As shown in 
the figure, as the supply of reserves increases from S1 to S2, the policy 
rate falls from i* to ir. As the supply of reserves increases even further 
from S2 to S3, the policy rate remains anchored at the interest rate on 
reserves, ir. 
The corridor system and, in particular, the corridor floor, allow 
the central bank to separate interest rate policy from liquidity policy. 
Figure 2
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This separation can be important in a liquidity crisis when the central 
bank might need to pump an unusually large quantity of reserves into 
the banking system. Without the interest rate floor established by the 
corridor, such an injection of reserves could push the policy rate well 
below its target. This phenomenon occurred in the United States when 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the Federal Reserve to temporar-
ily pump a large amount of reserves into the system (as shown in Chart 
1). Because the Federal Reserve paid no interest on reserves at the time, 
the injection of liquidity led to a decline in the federal funds rate below 
its target rate that lasted several days. 
More recently, in response to the financial crisis of 2008-09, the 
Federal Reserve’s injections of reserves have literally been “off the chart” 
(as shown in Chart 1). As noted earlier (and shown in Chart 3), this 
increase in the supply of reserves initially led to the funds rate falling 
below its target rate. The introduction of interest on reserves in Octo-
ber 2008 eventually helped anchor the funds rate near the FOMC’s 
target rate. Since December 2008, when the FOMC lowered the funds 
rate target to a range of 0 to 25 basis points and lowered the interest rate 
on reserves to 25 basis points, the federal funds rate has traded close to, 
but still below, the rate on excess reserves. Nevertheless, the payment of 
Figure 3
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interest on reserves has allowed the Federal Reserve to vastly increase the 
size of its balance sheet while generally keeping the funds rate slightly 
above zero and maintaining activity in the interbank market. 
The floor established by the interest rate on reserves will, in theory, 
also help the Federal Reserve exit from its current highly accommoda-
tive policy stance when the time comes. As shown in Figure 2, the Fed-
eral Reserve can raise the overnight interbank rate by announcing an 
increase in the interest rate on reserves. This action can be implemented 
without a reduction in the supply of reserves, allowing the Fed to in-
dependently determine the appropriate speed with which to shrink its 
balance sheet. Combined with various tools to shrink the balance sheet, 
the payment of interest on reserves will allow the Federal Reserve to 
eventually renormalize monetary policy.11 Once the supply of reserves 
has fallen within the range of the downward-sloping portion of the de-
mand curve for reserves, monetary policy can potentially operate under 
a pure corridor system, as depicted in Figure 4.
International experience
While the Federal Reserve is currently relying on the interest rate 
on reserves to help keep the federal funds rate above its zero lower limit, 
the Fed has not formally adopted a corridor system. In contrast, a num-
ber of central banks—including the Bank of Canada, Bank of England, 
Bank of Japan, European Central Bank (ECB), Norges Bank, Reserve 
Bank of Australia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Swedish 
Riksbank—have for some time operated under various versions of the 
corridor system. In the recent financial crisis, however, the ECB, Bank 
of Japan, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, and the Norges Bank have 
all moved to a floor system. The other central banks have maintained 
their policy rates near the center of their respective corridors. This sec-
tion describes the operating frameworks of a bank that is currently op-
erating at the floor—the ECB—and of a bank that has maintained a 
more traditional corridor framework—the Riksbank. The interest rate 
corridors of the other central banks—as they have evolved over time—
are shown in the charts in the appendix.12 
The ECB implemented a corridor system when it came into ex-
istence in June 1998. The system became operative with the launch 
of the euro in 1999. The ECB’s two standing facilities form the floor ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  19
and ceiling of the overnight interest rate corridor. The floor is set by 
the bank’s deposit facility. This facility allows financial institutions to 
make overnight deposits with the national central banks. Under nor-
mal circumstances, the deposit facility rate is less than the market rate, 
discouraging the facility’s use. The ceiling rate is determined by the 
ECB’s marginal lending facility, which allows banks to obtain overnight 
liquidity at a penalty to market rates. Since there is generally no credit 
limit at the marginal lending facility, it has served as an effective upper 
limit on overnight rates.13 
Typically, the Governing Council of the ECB determines the stance 
of monetary policy at its first meeting each month, setting both its 
target rate and the width of the corridor around the target. Given the 
target overnight rate, the council chooses how much higher than the 
target the bank will lend at its marginal lending facility, and how much 
lower than the target it will set the deposit facility rate. The ECB then 
uses a number of open market instruments to steer overnight rates.
The interest rate corridor was originally uneven, with the marginal 
lending facility set 150 basis points higher than the target rate and the 
deposit facility rate set 100 basis points below the target (Chart 4). How-
ever, accompanying its April 8, 1999 rate cut, the corridor was narrowed 
Figure 4
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to 200 basis points, with the target rate at the center. This corridor was, 
for the most part, maintained until the recent financial crisis. During the 
crisis, actual overnight rates were driven near the floor of the corridor due 
to the ECB’s efforts to boost liquidity. The corridor was temporarily nar-
rowed to 100 basis points in October 2008. It was restored to 200 basis 
points in early 2009, but narrowed slightly after the ECB’s meeting on 
May 7, 2009, to its present width of 150 basis points.
The Riksbank introduced its corridor system in June 1994 follow-
ing the elimination of reserve requirements on April 1, 1994 (Chart 
5). As originally conceived, the governor of the Riksbank would set the 
repo rate within a corridor determined by the Governing Board of the 
bank. This structure was adopted to allow flexibility in setting interest 
rates in response to fluctuations in exchange rates. When the corridor 
system was first introduced, the corridor was asymmetric, with the ceil-
ing rate set 55 basis points above the repo rate and the deposit rate set 
95 basis points below the lending rate. Because the corridor was set by 
the Governing Board, while the repo rate was determined by the gov-
ernor, the target rate and the corridor did not always move in tandem. 
In 1999, the Swedish government granted the Riksbank greater in-
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Executive Board. The rate corridor remained asymmetric until Decem-
ber 7, 2000, when the Executive Board indicated that the deposit and 
lending rates would no longer be used to signal monetary policy. In-
stead, the repo rate would signal policy and would normally be set at the 
center of an interest rate corridor 150 basis points wide. 
As the Riksbank eased policy in response to the global financial 
crisis, the interest rate corridor was temporarily narrowed. On April 22, 
2009, the corridor was narrowed to 100 basis points as the repo rate 
was cut from 1 percent to 0.5 percent. This action placed the floor of 
the corridor at the zero lower interest rate bound. Three months later, 
on July 8, the repo rate was cut to 25 basis points, placing the deposit 
rate at -25 basis points. Despite the disincentive to hold balances at the 
central bank from a negative deposit rate, banks continued to maintain 
unusually large deposits.
At its July 7, 2010 meeting, the Riksbank’s Executive Board began 
to reverse course and raised the repo rate to 0.5 percent. In addition, it 
once again widened the corridor to 150 basis points, thereby maintain-
ing the negative deposit rate. The Riksbank stated that the negative 
deposit rate has not greatly affected the quantity of deposits, in part 
because the Bank maintains a narrower (20 basis points wide) interday 22  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
corridor for “fine-tuning operations.” At its September 2010 meeting, 
the Riksbank’s executive board raised rates once again, placing the floor 
of the corridor back in non-negative territory.14 
In general, researchers have found that the corridor system has been 
successful in limiting fluctuations in overnight rates and in allowing 
central banks to provide considerable liquidity to the banking system 
during financial crises. For example, in studying eight central banks 
operating under some version of the corridor system, Bowman, Ga-
gnon, and Leahy find that “in cases in which central bank balances were 
abundant and a central bank’s target for the overnight market rate was 
at or close to the policy rate meant to serve as a floor for the overnight 
rate, these policy rate floors appeared to contain downward movements 
in market interest rates.”15 
In addition, Bowman and others find several examples over the 
past ten years where central banks tightened policy without reducing 
reserve balances. In these cases, the central bank raised the floor under 
the policy rate, lifting other rates with it. “On balance, we read the evi-
dence as indicating that interest paid on excess reserve balances (or the 
equivalent) can be used by a central bank to tighten monetary policy 
and reduce reliance on supporting operations to drain reserves.”
Challenges for the Federal Reserve
While the corridor and floor systems appear to have been used ef-
fectively in a number of central banks, the effectiveness of such a system 
is not established for the Federal Reserve. Three issues in particular may 
limit the effectiveness of a corridor system in the United States—a soft 
floor, a porous ceiling, and a diverse decision-making structure.
A soft floor. As noted earlier, the Federal Reserve began paying inter-
est on reserves in October 2008. A month later, it began setting the rate 
on excess balances equal to the lowest FOMC target rate in effect dur-
ing the reserve maintenance period.16 Since that time, however, the fed-
eral funds rate has persistently traded below the rate paid on reserves. As 
a result, interest on reserves has proven to be a soft floor in the United 
States. Why any financial institution would make a risky loan in the 
federal funds market to another institution at a rate below the risk-free 
rate paid by the Federal Reserve is puzzling. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  23
The answer to the puzzle is likely found in the institutional charac-
teristics of the federal funds market.17 In particular, the soft floor is like-
ly due to the presence of financial institutions in the overnight market 
that, under current law, are not eligible to receive interest on reserves 
held at the Federal Reserve. In particular, the government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs)—including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—and 
some international institutions have accounts at the Reserve Banks but 
receive no interest on the reserves held in those accounts. As a result, 
these institutions have an incentive to lend overnight funds to other 
institutions willing to pay a positive rate of return. 
Normally, banks might be expected to be willing to pay up to the 
interest rate on reserves to borrow from the GSEs. A bank could borrow 
from the GSE at a rate below what it receives from the Federal Reserve 
and deposit the funds at the Fed. In this transaction, the bank would 
earn a return equal to the difference between the rate of interest on 
reserves and the rate paid to borrow from the GSE. As banks competed 
to borrow from the GSEs, the overnight rate paid to the GSEs might be 
expected to rise up to the level of the interest rate on reserves. However, 
this arbitrage opportunity has not been fully exploited, and the funds 
rate has tended to trade below the floor established by the interest rate 
on reserves.
Among a number of explanations offered for this anomalous be-
havior, the most common view is that the GSEs have limited their lend-
ing to a small number of banks. They have done this because their 
overnight loans are not collateralized and therefore carry some risk of 
default. Especially in the current situation, where many banks have 
failed, the risk of default has apparently made the GSEs cautious about 
which banks to lend to and how much they lend. While the risk to 
the GSEs is likely small, it has allowed the banks to exert some market 
power over the GSEs which in turn has allowed the banks to pay a 
lower rate on overnight funds than the rate on reserves.18      
The question now is whether the soft floor under the federal funds 
rate will limit the effectiveness of the interest rate on reserves as a policy 
tool. When the time comes to begin removing the extraordinary mon-
etary accommodation put in place during the financial crisis, will the 
Fed be able to push up market rates by increasing interest on reserves?  24  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Although the answer will not be known for sure until the FOMC 
begins to exit its highly accommodative policy stance, international 
evidence is reassuring.19 Bowman and others argue that, while limited 
access to interest-earning deposit accounts at central banks may weaken 
the link between the floor and market rates, it need not significantly re-
duce the effectiveness of interest on reserves as a policy tool. Even if the 
interest rate on reserves is not a solid floor, arbitrage in the interbank 
market should maintain a tight link between the policy rate and the 
market rate. “Our case studies do not provide examples of tightening 
when the spread is inverted, but they do support the finding that the 
positive spreads that prevailed during tightening episodes generally re-
mained stable (that is, market rates typically rose in step with increases 
in the interest rate paid on excess reserves or its equivalent)” (p. 4). In 
addition, the Fed can drain reserves through various temporary opera-
tions or through outright sales of securities to provide additional sup-
port under the funds rate.
A porous ceiling. Another concern for the Federal Reserve is the ef-
fectiveness of the discount rate in establishing a ceiling for the federal 
funds rate. With the federal funds rate currently trading below its floor, 
this concern is of little relevance today. However, once the Federal Re-
serve’s balance sheet returns to a more normal size, so that the supply of 
reserves intersects the downward sloping segment of the demand sched-
ule, a porous ceiling could lead to occasional spikes in the federal funds 
rate. Such spikes could occur when the supply of reserves or settlement 
balances unexpectedly falls or demand increases and banks are left short 
of funds to meet reserve requirements or settle payments. If for some 
reason, banks are reluctant to borrow from the Federal Reserve and 
instead go to the interbank market for overnight funds, the funds rate 
could be driven higher than the discount rate.
But why would a financial institution pay more than the discount 
rate charged by the Fed to instead borrow from other institutions on 
the interbank market? One reason is that banks may perceive a stigma 
associated with discount window borrowing.20 This stigma stems from 
concerns that discount window borrowing could signal to other finan-
cial institutions, investors, and regulators that the borrowing institu-
tion is financially distressed. Although the Federal Reserve does not im-
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the discount window, the interconnectedness of the interbank market 
may make it possible for banks to figure out which institutions have 
borrowed from the discount window.21  
Evidence suggests such a stigma does in fact inhibit discount win-
dow borrowing, even though primary credit is extended only to deposi-
tory institutions that are in generally sound financial condition.22  For 
example, Furfine finds that the volume of borrowing from the discount 
window after 2003—when the Fed introduced a penalty discount rate—
was lower than interbank borrowing behavior would have predicted.23  
In addition, in August 2007, at the beginning of the recent financial 
crisis, the Board of Governors lowered the discount rate from 100 basis 
points above the target federal funds rate to 50 basis points. Nevertheless, 
despite severe liquidity shortages, borrowing remained weak.24 Finally, 
the federal funds rate has occasionally spiked above the discount rate. 
For example, in September and October of 2008, the federal funds rate 
rose above the discount rate on several days in the wake of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy and the debate, and ultimate passage, in Congress 
of the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Whether the discount rate will provide an effective ceiling on rates 
in the future (in the event the Federal Reserve moves more formally 
toward a corridor operating system) is unclear. Particularly in times of 
financial stress, depository institutions may continue to be reluctant 
to borrow from the Fed, limiting the discount window’s effectiveness 
in moderating deviations in the federal funds rate from target. That 
said, to the extent stigma remains a concern, policymakers may need 
to take further actions to encourage depository intuitions to view the 
discount window as a standing facility from which sound institutions 
with sound collateral may borrow without administrative restrictions 
or stigma.
Diverse decision-makers. A final issue for the Federal Reserve, es-
pecially as it unwinds its current highly accommodative policy, is the 
sequencing of policy actions by the FOMC, the Board of Governors, 
and the Reserve Bank Boards of Directors. Traditionally, the stance of 
policy is signaled by the federal funds rate target. With the current 
abundance of reserves in the banking system, though, the funds rate 
has fallen to the soft floor established by the interest rate on reserves. 
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Governors establishes the interest rate on reserves. Thus, the sequenc-
ing of actions by the FOMC and Board of Governors could affect the 
actual stance of policy. If the FOMC acts to raise the federal funds rate 
target without a corresponding action by the Board to raise the interest 
rate on reserves, the funds rate would likely remain stuck at the floor 
established by the interest rate on reserves. Conversely, if the Board of 
Governors acts to raise the interest rate on reserves, the federal funds 
rate could rise in lock step without any action taken by the FOMC. 
Clearly, a mechanism will be needed to coordinate these moves.
A coordination mechanism may also be needed when monetary 
policy has been normalized and the funds rate target is again within the 
corridor established by the discount rate at the ceiling and the interest 
rate on reserves at the floor. Typically, in a corridor system, the target 
policy rate is set in the middle of the corridor and serves as the key sig-
nal of the stance of policy. The ceiling and floor rates are typically set a 
fixed increment above and below the target rate and move in lock step 
with any change in the policy target. As suggested above, if the Federal 
Reserve were to adopt a formal corridor system, the framework would 
likely require coordination between the FOMC and Board of Governors 
in establishing the floor rate. In addition, coordination will be required 
with the Reserve Bank Boards of Directors, which recommend discount 
rate changes subject to the approval of the Board of Governors. 
While these coordination issues may complicate the operation of 
a corridor system in the United States, they are not likely to be in-
surmountable. After all, the FOMC encompasses the members of the 
Board of Governors and five of the Reserve Bank presidents who serve 
as voting members of the FOMC on a rotating basis. The Reserve Bank 
presidents in turn recommend discount rate actions to their respective 
Boards of Directors. Thus, while complex, there are established inter-
relationships among the FOMC members who determine the federal 
funds rate target, the Boards of Directors of the Reserve Banks who rec-
ommend discount rate changes, and the Board of Governors who ap-
prove discount rate changes and establish the interest rate on reserves.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Federal Reserve’s unprecedented easing of monetary policy in 
the global financial crisis resulted in a huge increase in reserves and ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  27
drove the federal funds rate virtually to zero. These actions also ren-
dered the Federal Reserve’s traditional mechanism for setting the target 
federal funds rate unworkable. Reserves became so abundant that the 
funds rate eventually became insensitive to changes in the supply of re-
serves. Unless the Federal Reserve drains a substantial amount of these 
reserves from the banking system—through temporary operations or 
outright asset sales—control over the funds rate now largely depends on 
the floor established by the interest rate paid on reserves. The interest 
rate on reserves will therefore likely be an important tool of monetary 
policy as the Federal Reserve eventually exits from its highly accom-
modative policy stance.
With the establishment of a discount rate set above the target fed-
eral funds rate, along with interest on reserves, the Federal Reserve now 
has in place the basic elements of a corridor operating system. Such a 
system is already in operation at a number of other central banks, in-
cluding the ECB. Once monetary policy in the United States is normal-
ized so that the federal funds rate again becomes sensitive to changes in 
the supply of reserves, the Federal Reserve may want to consider for-
mally moving toward a corridor system. A corridor system would have 
the advantage of potentially providing tighter control over the federal 
funds rate target in a banking system in which reserve requirements are 
nonbinding. In addition, in times of financial stress, a corridor system 
could allow the Federal Reserve to inject a large amount of liquidity 
into the banking system while maintaining control over the funds rate 
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ENDNOTES
1The FOMC’s policy mandate is defined in the Federal Reserve Act, which 
requires that: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long-run growth of the mon-
etary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long-run potential 
to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
2This section draws on Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2005) and Sellon and Weiner (1996). See these sources or Bernanke (2005) for a 
more detailed discussion of the traditional operating framework.
3In a sweep account, funds are automatically transferred from deposit ac-
counts with reserve requirements to accounts, such as money market deposit ac-
counts, that do not have reserve requirements. 
4Volatility could be exacerbated if the demand for settlement balances were 
less interest sensitive than the traditional demand for reserve balances (Sellon and 
Weiner, 1996).
5More recently, in November 2010, the FOMC announced that it planned to 
purchase an additional $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end 
of the second quarter of 2011. 
6More technically, the rate on required reserves was calculated as the average 
targeted federal funds rate established by the FOMC over each reserve mainte-
nance period less ten basis points, and the rate on excess reserves was the lowest 
targeted federal funds rate for each reserve maintenance period less 75 basis points.
7This section draws on Woodford. Also, see Berentsen and Monet, and Whi-
tesell for more technical discussions of a corridor system.
8For ease of exposition and to simplify, the analysis will focus only on reserve 
balances—that is, total reserves less applied vault cash. In addition, the analysis 
abstracts from contractual clearing balances under which depository institutions 
hold, under contractual agreements, an amount of reserves in excess of require-
ments in exchange for credits for priced services provided by the Federal Reserve 
banks. With the quantity of reserves currently well above required reserves, as well 
as the reserves needed for settlement and clearing, this simplification does not af-
fect the qualitative analysis. 
9Under the Federal Reserve’s current procedures, as established in January 
2003, credit is made available to help depository institutions make short-term ad-
justments to their balance sheets and as an alternative source of funds in the event 
of a shortfall in the supply of Federal Reserve balances. With an above-market rate 
and the provision of funds only to financially sound institutions with collateral 
satisfactory to the Reserve Bank making the loan, “primary credit” is extended 
largely without administrative restrictions. Nevertheless, it is intended as a backup 
source of credit, not a regular source of funding. 32  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The Federal Reserve also provides a “secondary credit facility,” through which 
it lends funds at a higher rate to less-sound financial institutions to “meet backup 
liquidity needs when its use is consistent with the borrowing institution’s timely 
return to a reliance on market sources of funding or with the orderly resolution of 
a troubled institution’s difficulties.” 
Finally, the Federal Reserve has a “seasonal credit facility” designed to help 
small depository institutions manage seasonal fluctuations in their loans and de-
posits (Federal Reserve Board of Governors, pp. 46-50). 
For monetary policy purposes, the primary credit facility is the one relevant 
in limiting upward pressure on the federal funds rate when there is a shortage of 
reserves. The interest rate on primary credit—commonly referred to as the “dis-
count rate”—is the rate that forms the ceiling in a corridor system. 
10Berentsen, Marchesiani, and Waller provide a theoretical argument show-
ing that a positive spread between the floor and ceiling of the corridor is socially 
optimal. “[W]ith restrictions on the central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue, 
the optimal policy necessitates setting the deposit rate strictly below the target 
rate. Moreover, it always involves a strictly positive interest-rate spread. The op-
timality of a non-zero corridor arises because it improves risk sharing and hence 
welfare by shifting central bank money to those market participants who need it 
most urgently” (p. 3).
11These tools include term deposit accounts at the Federal Reserve, large-
scale reverse repurchase operations, and outright asset sales. 
12Bowman, Gagnon, and Leahy provide a detailed description of the experi-
ence of these eight central banks in using interest on reserves in a corridor or floor 
operating system, especially in tightening monetary policy. Sellon and Weiner 
(1997) discuss the experiences of the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, and 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in conducting monetary policy in the absence 
of reserve requirements.
13For a comprehensive description of the ECB’s monetary policy framework, 
see European Central Bank (2008).
14http://www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=12498,www.riksbank.se/ 
templates/Page.aspx?id=32731.
15An exception was the United Kingdom, where in 2009 and 2010 the ster-
ling rate has traded below the policy rate floor. As will be discussed later, the 
United Kingdom is similar to the United States in that the market for overnight 
funds includes institutions that are not eligible for payment of interest on reserves 
(Bowman, Gagnon, and Leahy, p. 1).
16The rate on required reserves was set equal to the average target federal 
funds rate over the reserve maintenance period. 
17Bech and Klee discuss the heterogeneity across participants in the federal 
funds market and the resulting market segmentation. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  33
18In addition, as Bech and Klee point out, “the GSEs have become a larger 
share of the federal funds market in recent history and hence have pulled down 
the weighted average federal funds rate” (p. 3).
19International evidence comes from the Bank of England, the Bank of Cana-
da, and the Norges Bank, all of which “monitor or target a measure of market rates 
that include lending rates for institutions without access to interest on deposits at 
the central bank, so by those metrics, failures of policy rate floors are potentially 
more likely” (Bowman, Gagnon, and Leahy, p. 3). 
20There is also a cost associated with providing collateral for a discount win-
dow loan that may cause the effective rate on the loan to be higher than the 
discount rate.
21The Board of Governors does release a weekly report providing aggregate 
borrowings from the Reserve Banks’ discount windows. Moreover, effective July 
21, 2010, under the terms of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, the Federal Reserve will begin publicly disclosing, with a lag of 
about two years, the names of institutions borrowing from the discount window, 
the amount borrowed, the interest rate paid, and information on the types and 
amount of collateral pledged. This information will be released quarterly and may 
be disclosed with less than a two-year lag if the chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board determines it to be in the public’s interest and it does not harm the opera-
tion of the window (www.frbdiscountwindow.org).
22Institutions that do not qualify for primary credit are eligible for secondary 
credit (www.frbdiscountwindow.org). For evidence that stigma has resulted in a 
porous ceiling, see Courtois and Ennis.
23Furfine, as summarized in Courtois and Ennis.
24In response to these shortages, the Federal Reserve introduced, on a tempo-
rary basis, the Term Auction Facility (TAF) under which the Fed conducted bi-
weekly auctions of term funds to depository institutions. These auctions reduced 
the perceived stigma of borrowing from the Fed since they were widely subscribed 
to and the names of borrowers were not publicly released. The final TAF auction 
was conducted on March 8, 2010.34  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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